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Abstract: The Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis taking place since 2008 are real-life 
tests for policies aimed at promoting inclusive labor markets in the Eurozone. Therefore, this 
article discusses first how the risk of being a labor market outsider evolved in the Eurozone 
during the crises, and whether this risk diverged between social groups. Using EU-SILC data, 
we describe the overall level of outsider risks before and during the crises – risks of being 
either unemployed, temporarily employed or earning a low wage – among the labor force 
(‘polarization’) and the concentration of these risks among vulnerable groups (‘marginaliza-
tion’). Our results show that the outsider risks have particularly increased in the Southern 
European countries, and for young workers throughout the EU, and in the case of unem-
ployment, also for low-skilled workers. In the second step, we study how employment pro-
tection legislation, union density and wage bargaining systems influence polarization and 
marginalization in the context of an economic crisis. In contrast to discussions about the end 
of Eurosclerosis, we find that strict employment protection and centralized bargaining in-
crease the marginalization of vulnerable groups while strong unions can reduce polarization. 
 
Keywords: labor markets, outsider, polarization, marginalization, economic crisis, Eurozone 
JEL classification: E240, J310, J640 
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1. Introduction 
Orthodox labor economics propose that European labor markets react to economic shocks 
mostly with increasing unemployment rates rather than increasing wage inequality. This 
reflects their stronger institutional regulation, e.g. due to stricter employment protection 
legislation (EPL), stronger unions, higher taxes, higher welfare benefits, and intermediary 
wage bargaining systems (Blanchard, 2006; Blau and Kahn, 2002; Layard et al., 2005; Siebert, 
1997). Such an institutional setting has been interpreted as the source of labor market rigidi-
ty contributing to higher unemployment rates, higher real wage levels and less wage ine-
quality in Europe. Moreover, it may lead to a greater division of labor markets into insiders 
and outsiders (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988; Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). The literature on 
labor market dualization and the insider/outsider divide has also found that labor market 
institutions are crucial, although its results put in doubt the success of labor market deregu-
lation and flexibilization (Barbieri, 2009; Barbieri and Cutuli, 2016; Biegert, 2017; Emmeneg-
ger et al., 2012; Gebel and Giesecke, 2016; Giesselmann, 2014). 
This ideal typical model of rigid, segmented European labor markets seemed to have been 
largely overcome due to labor market reforms since the 1990s, particularly the “activation 
turn” of employment policies (Boeri, 2011). European member states, the EU, and interna-
tional organizations tried to foster more flexible and more inclusive labor markets by activat-
ing the unemployed and inactive parts of their labor force, and by reducing employment 
protection for the employed (Eichhorst et al., 2008; Serrano Pascual and Magnusson, 2007). 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2009: 411–412) even speak of “a sea change in labor market conditions” 
and state that structural unemployment has vanished in Europe.  
The Great Recession and the subsequent Eurozone crisis were real-life tests for the assump-
tion that European labor markets have outgrown their rigidities and bridged insider-outsider 
divides. Particularly, Eurozone countries had to rely on their labor markets as buffers against 
the economic shock from the crises as alternative buffers like external devaluations, auto-
matic stabilizers, international transfer payments or migration did not exist or played only a 
minor role in the Eurozone (Boeri and Jimeno, 2016). Orthodox labor economics has pro-
posed two possible adjustment mechanisms during an economic downturn: increasing wage 
inequality or increasing unemployment. Due to the more egalitarian institutions in Europe, 
unemployment rather than wage inequality had been the dominant adjustment strategy in 
recent history (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Blau and Kahn, 2002). However, it has been 
argued that other adjustment mechanisms exist and may be even more important in times 
of economic shocks, e.g. increasing job insecurity induced by fixed-term contracts (DiPrete, 
2007: 612; Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005). Therefore, this article focuses on three types of 
labor market risks associated with ‘outsiderness’ in the Eurozone: unemployment, low wage, 
and temporary employment. The aim is to investigate whether labor markets in the Euro-
zone are already “beyond Eurosclerosis” or whether classical labor market institutions still 
boost outsider risks. This translates into the following research questions: How did labor 
market risks evolve in the Eurozone countries and how have these risks been distributed 
among the core workforce and more vulnerable labor market groups? How did classical labor 
market institutions shape these risks? 
We discuss these questions by distinguishing between polarization and marginalization (cf. 
also Heidenreich, 2015). The term polarization is used here to refer to the division of the 
labor force into insiders and outsiders (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). We consider outsiders 
to be persons who are either unemployed or who work in “bad jobs” (Kalleberg, 2011: 10) 
with either precarious employment conditions or lower wages (Rueda, 2005: 62; cf. also 
Lindbeck and Snower, 1988: 3, 246-248). Marginalization, on the other hand, is defined as 
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the concentration of the risk of being an outsider on vulnerable labor market groups, such 
as, for example, women, migrants, un-skilled or young people. Even if a labor market is high-
ly polarized, vulnerable groups are not necessarily marginalized if outsider risks are equally 
spread among the labor force. Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate between outsider 
risks for the labor force in general and specific risks of (often) disadvantaged socio-economic 
groups. This rigor distinction is one of the major contributions of this article to the debate on 
labor market dualization in the Eurozone. 
In the following, we develop three hypotheses concerning the polarization and marginaliza-
tion of labor markets and their institutional determinants (2). We then introduce our data 
and methods (3). In the first step of our analysis, we assess the risk of the labor force to be 
either unemployed, low-paid or temporarily employed before and during the crisis and de-
scribe how the relative risks of vulnerable social groups evolved over time (4). Based on 
these analyzes, we study how certain labor market institutions influenced polarization and 
marginalization in the second step of our analysis (5). The article concludes with a summary 
and an outlook (6). 
2. Two facets of labor market outsiderness 
In the following, we will discuss the concepts of polarization and marginalization, their insti-
tutional determinants and how labor markets will react to an economic recession with dif-
ferent patterns of adjustment. 
2.1. Polarization of the labor force in insider and outsider 
Segmentation theories start from the observation that labor markets are divided in seg-
ments with differently favorable working conditions, wages and levels of social and job pro-
tections. Kalleberg (2011) has analyzed this divide between “good” and “bad” jobs, revealing 
that it is the result of polarized and precarious employment systems. From an institutionalist 
perspective, dual labor market theory explains these differences by the role of organizational 
rules for the recruitment, training, remuneration, and promotion of employees. Insiders 
have the opportunity to develop their competences and to get promoted in internal labor 
markets, while the employment conditions of outsiders in secondary or external labor mar-
kets are governed by supply and demand (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Insiders have success-
fully entered an internal labor market via a point of entry – a process which is open to dis-
crimination. From an economic perspective, the insider-outsider divide is explained by the 
higher labor turn-over costs of the unemployed, in particular due to the lack of firm-specific 
competences, contacts and inner-organizational networks (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). The 
insider/outsider divide is conceived as a continuous variable ranging from unemployed to 
employed. From a political science perspective, Rueda (2005) highlights the role of political 
processes and institutional rules. Here, outsiders are not always unemployed, but do not 
enjoy institutional protection against dismissal and other precarious working conditions 
when employed - usually they are the ones to bear the brunt of demand fluctuations in the 
labor market. The political process which creates insiders and outsiders has been termed 
dualization (Emmenegger et al., 2012). On this basis, it can be retained that insiders are 
characterized by better employment conditions than outsiders. This gap can be explained by 
organizational rules, statistical discrimination, a higher level of competences and experience, 
strategies of social closure and exclusion by core workers, or legal rules. Therefore, an out-
sider status is characterized by unemployment or higher job insecurity and precarious work-
ing conditions due to the absence of individual, organizational, associational or legal forms 
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of protection. Instead of focusing on the economic or political processes of creating the in-
sider-outsider divide, we will utilize the polarization concept proposed by Kalleberg (2011) 
which concentrates on different employment conditions and risks. 
Therefore, and in contrast to previous studies which have typically conceptualized outsiders 
foremost as the unemployed (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) or temporarily employed (Fervers 
and Schwander, 2015), we use a multidimensional perspective on outsiderness. In doing so, 
we combine the three labor market risks most commonly associated with outsiderness - un-
employment, temporary contracts and low wages - in order to account for the multiple fac-
ets of labor market disadvantages faced by outsiders like the exclusion from the labor mar-
ket, employment insecurities and falling below living wages. This polarization concept thus 
tries to better grasp the multidimensionality of labor market segmentation. It would be de-
sirable to include other facets of outsiderness such as contingent work or involuntary part-
time and solo self-employment. However, this would necessitate more data and a more de-
tailed conceptualization of the contractual dimension of outsiderness. Furthermore, persons 
affected by other forms of outsiderness are often exposed by at least one of the three risks 
taken into consideration (e.g. involuntary part-time and low wages). 
Empirically, we will analyze how the Great Recession and the subsequent Eurozone crisis 
have affected the polarization of the labor force in the Eurozone. We expect that these cri-
ses, indicated by a shrinking gross domestic product (GDP), will contribute to higher em-
ployment risks in general thus increasing the polarization of the labor force (H1a). 
2.2. Marginalization of vulnerable labor market groups 
In principle, increasing labor market risks can be distributed evenly among the whole labor 
force, i.e. in form of a general flexibilization or liberalization of the world of work. However, 
they mostly affect specific groups more than other. In contrast to polarization, which focuses 
on the level of employment risks among the labor force independent of their social composi-
tion, this phenomenon can be termed marginalization (Emmenegger et al., 2012: 11–12; 
Heidenreich, 2015). It reflects the fact that the allocation of individuals to insider or outsider 
positions is not done randomly. For instance, Doeringer and Piore (1971) expected that 
young persons, women, foreigners or those with a minority-ethnic background, and low-
skilled persons were more likely to be unemployed or earn lower wages. Kalleberg (2011: ch. 
3) discusses the role of education, gender, family, immigration status, race, and age on po-
larization. These groups often have lower chances of accessing privileged positions in inter-
nal labor markets – whether this is explained by lower human capital, higher labor turnover 
costs, social closure, organizational and institutional rules, or discrimination. For example, 
young workers at the beginning of their careers change jobs more often than those in the 
middle of their careers and are more difficult to assess in terms of productivity and motiva-
tion by potential employers due to their lack of work experience or references (Bell and 
Blanchflower, 2011; Spence, 1973). Therefore, entry positions often have fixed-term con-
tracts and lower wages so that employers can minimize turnover costs and encourage ten-
ure and work commitment for seniority wages. The higher risk for women to be in the exter-
nal labor market can be explained by occupational and sectoral segregation and difficulties 
in reconciling work and family life (Anker, 1997; England, 1992). As a result of maternity 
leave, for example, mothers are likely to leave and re-enter the labor market several times 
during their working life. Due to language barriers, non-accredited educational certificates 
and discrimination, migrants are often employed in worse jobs with lower remuneration 
(Kogan, 2007). Educational credentials can also be used to monopolize access to privileged 
positions in internal labor markets, while low-skilled workers are mostly employed in the 
external labor market and therefore face higher labor market risks (Brown, 2001; Doeringer 
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and Piore, 1971; Gebel and Giesecke, 2011; Werfhorst, 2011). Contemporary studies confirm 
that these four groups are still at the lower margins of the labor market in terms of wages, 
unemployment and temporary employment (Barbieri, 2009; Emmenegger et al., 2012; Kalle-
berg, 2012; Koch and Fritz, 2013; Schwander and Häusermann, 2013). In the following, we 
therefore designate these four social groups as vulnerable groups. The members of these 
groups are not necessarily outsiders, even if they may be at a higher risk of being outsiders. 
Therefore, we distinguish between the polarization of the labor force depending on their 
risks of being low-paid, unemployed or temporarily employed and the marginalization of 
vulnerable groups which refers to the (potentially higher) labor market risks of young peo-
ple, women, low-qualified workers, and migrants. 
Our interest lays with how economic shocks from a crisis affect the marginalization of vul-
nerable groups. While a shrinking GDP will directly translate into increasing employment 
risks, its effects on different socio-economic groups might be shaped by various labor market 
institutions. Therefore, we assume that the effect of a shrinking GDP growth on the margin-
alization of vulnerable groups is first and foremost moderated by the institutional setting of 
a country and will not have a direct effect on the degree of marginalization (H1b).  
2.3. Institutional determinants of polarization and marginalization 
The question is which institutions shape the polarization of the labor force as well as the 
marginalization of vulnerable groups during the financial and Eurozone crises. The previously 
mentioned literature focuses on the institutional regulation of labor markets by EPL, unions’ 
power, and wage bargaining institutions (Blanchard, 2006; Blau and Kahn, 2002; Layard et 
al., 2005; Siebert, 1997) and analyzed its effect on the employment opportunities of already 
disadvantaged labor market groups (Biegert, 2017; Gebel and Giesecke, 2011, 2016; Gies-
selmann, 2014). The persistence of “Eurosclerotic” institutions in some countries may be 
critical for understanding the heterogeneity of European labor markets characterized on the 
one hand by rigid, polarized and marginalizing structures and by flexible, inclusive patterns 
on the other. 
A strict EPL is often believed to have a negative effect on the employment level in a labor 
market (Siebert, 1997). The empirical evidence for this claim is rather ambiguous: While Ber-
tola (1990) and Bertola et al. (1999) found less dynamic labor markets in Europe, but no evi-
dence for an effect of stricter EPL on lower employment and higher unemployment levels, 
other studies found a positive relation between EPL and unemployment (Blanchard, 2006; 
Layard et al., 2005). Already Nickell (1997: 72) showed that a strict EPL strengthens insiders 
in contrast to outsiders, but does not negatively influence the unemployment level. This re-
sult has been further specified by the debate on marginal flexibilization: An increasing gap 
between the EPL for temporary and regular jobs due to deregulation of already flexible em-
ployment contracts contributes to a further erosion of formerly stable employment condi-
tions (Barbieri and Cutuli, 2016), and to increasing youth temporary employment risks 
(Gebel and Giesecke, 2016). Therefore, we assume that EPLs can affect both polarization and 
marginalization. Stricter EPL for regular contracts seem to protect standard employment 
during a crisis, thus stabilizing the polarization level of the labor force. Marginalization of 
vulnerable groups, however, might increase due to higher hiring and firing costs. In addition, 
stricter regulations of the use of fixed-term contracts may lead to a higher marginalization of 
vulnerable groups due to fewer opportunities to enter the labor market during a crisis (H2a).  
Another classical labor market institution which is often associated with rigid labor markets 
is the wage bargaining system. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argue that wage bargaining both 
at the company and local levels, and wage bargaining in highly centralized, corporatist bar-
gaining systems is more sensitive to market pressures than wage bargaining at intermediate 
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levels. Consequently, the relationship between wage bargaining centralization and wage 
restraint is hump-shaped due to the lower possibility of wage moderation in regional and 
industry-wide negotiations in contrast to company and national negotiations (Calmfors and 
Driffill, 1988). Therefore, we assume less polarization of the labor force in both decentralized 
and highly centralized wage bargaining systems as wage moderation might reduce layoffs in 
a crisis. In addition, wage moderation may raise the chances for vulnerable groups to enter 
the labor market because of employment-friendly wage agreements (H2b). 
A higher union density, seen as a proxy of the bargaining power of unions and employees, is 
generally associated with better working conditions and a more equalitarian wage structure 
(Kenworthy, 2004). However, Rueda (2005: 72) mentions that strong unions may predomi-
nantly represent insider interests, thus contributing to further polarization and marginaliza-
tion of the labor force. More recent studies, however, have shown that strong unions also 
defend outsider interests by enforcing more inclusive employment policies (Benassi and 
Vlandas, 2016; Fervers and Schwander, 2015). For this reason, we assume that a higher un-
ion density might prevent the marginalization and perhaps even the polarization of the 
workforce even in times of economic downturns (H2c).  
3. Data and methods 
To analyze these proposed trends and effects, we examine cross-sectional data from the 19 
current Eurozone member states for the years 2005 to 2014 using the European Union Sta-
tistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, version April 2019; Goedemé, 2013; 
Lohmann, 2011; for a presentation of the EU-SILC and its caveats, see Wolff et al., 2010). As 
the Baltic countries were already part of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism since 
2004/05, we include them in our country sample. The chosen period contains the years be-
fore the crisis (2005-2008), during the Great Recession (2008-2009) and the Eurozone crisis 
(2010-2013), and up to a year after the turning point of the Eurozone crisis (2014). This al-
lows us to account for different patterns and timings of the crises. We restrict our sample to 
the labor force (excluding the self-employed) aged between 20 and 64 years. This age span 
excludes most persons who are still undergoing their secondary education or those that 
have just entered the labor market.  
In order to examine the development and determinants of labor market risks during the Eu-
rozone crisis, we employ a two-step procedure (cf. Lewis and Linzer, 2005). First, we calcu-
late and compare the polarization and marginalization of the labor force (without the self-
employed) on the basis of the respective individual outsider risks. In order to determine the 
level of polarization for every country in every year, we compute the share of the labor force 
that is either unemployed, temporarily employed, or earns low wages. We measure unem-
ployment at the individual level through self-defined current economic status. Temporary 
employment is defined as having a fixed-term contract (in contrast to a permanent contract). 
Low wages are measured as earning less than two thirds of the median hourly wage in the 
respondent’s country. The level of marginalization is calculated as the relative risk for four 
socio-demographic groups (young, women, low-skilled, and migrants) in comparison to the 
core workforce (prime-age, male, high-skilled, native). We define young persons as those 
between 20 and 24 years old and prime-age workers as those between 25-54 years. Low-
skilled persons are those that have completed no more than lower secondary education 
(ISCED 0-2), whereas high-skilled workers have graduated with a tertiary degree (ISCED 5-6). 
Migrants are defined as persons who either hold a foreign citizenship or were born abroad. 
To account for composition effects of these four vulnerable groups in the Eurozone coun-
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tries, we simultaneously estimate the effect of all groups on each outsider dimension using 
logistic regression models. Additionally, we control for individual health status and house-
hold type. Using this, we obtain the relative risks for each group separately. We use average 
marginal effects (AME) rather than odds ratios due to the former’s superior interpretability 
as probabilities, and its comparability across different models, groups and samples (Mood, 
2010). For the sake of simplicity, we only depict the results for the whole Eurozone.1 Later, 
we use the country-specific results, which are shown in the appendix in the figures A.1, A.2, 
A.3 and A.4, to calculate the level of marginalization as the average outsider risk of vulnera-
ble groups compared to the core workforce. In order to determine this average outsider risk, 
we sum up the regression coefficients for all groups on each of the three outsider dimen-
sions and divide the sum by twelve (4 groups x 3 dimensions). This allows us to reduce the 
number of dimensions for the comparison by creating an index for the marginalization of 
each group for each country-year. 
In the second step of our analysis, we construct a country-year panel data set with a pooled 
time-series-cross-section structure (TSCS) using the results from the first step as our inde-
pendent variables. This enables us to test the effect of GDP changes and certain labor mar-
ket institutions (and their interactions) on the degree of polarization and marginalization. 
After adding macro variables for the Eurozone members between 2005 and 2014, we end up 
with 170 country-years as observations. Based on our considerations in Section 2, we ana-
lyze the EPL effects for both regular and temporary contracts (Venn, 2009), union density, 
and centralization of wage bargaining (Visser, 2019). In case of missing values in the times 
series of the independent variables, values for missing years have been filled by linear or 
nearest neighbor interpolation. Due to a possible simultaneity bias, we lag every independ-
ent variable by one year. Since our dependent variables are both metric, we employ linear 
regression models. Although our independent variables can principally change over time, 
some rarely change, and most changes are rather small. Therefore, a Hausman-test suggests 
using random effects specifications rather than fixed effects (Hausman, 1978). As the 
Breusch and Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) for unobserved heterogeneity is positive, 
we use panel-corrected standard errors to account for country-wise heteroscedasticity and 
the violation of independence assumption between years (Beck and Katz, 1995). Additional-
ly, we allow for a first-order autocorrelation structure within panels as a Wooldridge test for 
serial autocorrelation indicates a first-order autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore, 
the coefficients of our models can be interpreted as between-country differences similar to 
random-effects regression models. Therefore, we are able to estimate the effects of labor 
market institutions on polarization and marginalization and the moderating effect of the 
economic recession. 
4. Polarization and marginalization in the Eurozone 
This section describes the trends of polarization and marginalization in the Eurozone. Figure 
1 shows the share of outsiders in the labor force in 2008 and 2014, i.e. persons who have a 
temporary contract, earn a low wage or who are currently unemployed. In Spain, for exam-
ple, the share of outsiders was 47 % in 2008, with an increase of 9 percentage points during 
                                                     
1 As the pooled dataset for the whole Eurozone is hierarchically structured (individuals nested in counties), we 
additionally add country fixed-effects and clustered standard errors controlling for country-specific differences 
regarding the mean and variance. 
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the crisis. Therefore, 56 % of the Spanish labor force was exposed to at least one of the 
abovementioned outsider risks in 2014. Labor market risks increased in the Eurozone – par-
ticularly in the Southern European countries, which leads to a higher divergence of labor 
market risks within the Eurozone. Table A1 in the online appendix displays the three single 
dimensions of outsider risks for the 19 Eurozone countries, as well as the weighted average 
for the Eurozone as a whole. It can be seen that unemployment plays the most central role 
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Figure 1: Polarization: Share of the labor force affected by outsider risks in 2008 and 2014. 
Notes: ES = Spain, EL = Greece, PT = Portugal, CY= Cyprus, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LT = Lithua-
nia, EA = Euro Area, SK = Slovakia, LU = Luxembourg, SI = Slovenia, LV = Latvia, DE = Germa-
ny, EE = Estonia, FR = France, AT = Austria, NL = Netherlands, FI = Finland, BE = Belgium, MT = 
Malta. Employees affected by outsider risks: Share of the labor force (20-64 years) of per-
sons who are either unemployed, temporarily employed or low-paid. Source: EU-SILC, own 
calculations. 
In order to analyze the marginalization of the vulnerable groups of young workers, low-
skilled workers, migrants and women in the Eurozone, we compare the development of their 
low wage, unemployment and temporary employment risks compared to the core work-
force. Figure 2 shows the average marginal effects for the four groups estimated by logistic 
regression models with country fixed-effects (for comprehensive tables of the models see 
tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the online appendix). The first panel in the top-left depicts the age 
gaps, indicating the marginalization of young workers (20-25 years) compared to prime-age 
workers (25-54 years) from 2005 to 2014. In 2008, the relative unemployment risk of young 
workers was about 8 percentage points higher when compared to prime-age workers. In 
2014, this gap rose to 14 percentage points. From 2005 to 2014, their relative temporary 
employment risk increased from 24 to 35 percentage points with a considerable drop be-
tween 2007 and 2011. At the same time, the relative low-wage risk for younger workers rose 
from 19 to 24 percentage points. In sum, marginalization increased for young workers com-
pared to prime-age workers in the Eurozone as described in the literature (Bell and Blanch-
flower, 2011), which indicates a further deterioration of the labor market situation for them. 
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However, this aggregated trend over the whole Eurozone area hides the much stronger in-
creases in the unemployment and temporary employment gap in the Southern European 
countries, which can be seen in the respective figures A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the online ap-
pendix. These growing relative risks for younger workers support the marginal flexibilization 
thesis (cf. Barbieri and Cutuli, 2016). 
The panel in the bottom-left shows the marginalization of migrants compared to natives. 
The unemployment risk gap of migrants has only slightly changed between 2005 and 2014, 
despite some ups and downs in-between. Simultaneously, the relative temporary employ-
ment risk declined slightly from 9 to 7 percentage points, and the gap in the low-wage risk 
increased from 9 to 12 percentage points. As migrants are under-sampled in most EU-SILC 
country samples, however, these results may not be representative of the high diversity of 
migrant populations in the Eurozone countries. The trends for the gaps in temporary em-
ployment and low-wage risk could be the result of dismissals -migrants with temporary con-
tracts were typically laid off more frequently during the crisis and re-employment for them 
was often only possible in lower paying jobs. 
The gender gaps are depicted in the top-right panel. Interestingly, the unemployment gap, 
which was 2.7 percentage points in 2005, has disappeared or even become slightly negative 
since 2009. Simultaneously, the gender gaps in the temporary employment risk and low-
wage risk remained relatively stable with only very small changes. This finding is contrary to 
previous studies which have suggested that women were more affected by the economic 
crisis due to harsh austerity measures in the public sector (Karamessini and Rubery, 2014). 
Instead, we observe that the gender gaps in unemployment, low-wage, and temporary em-
ployment risk have instead been decreasing, albeit slightly. 
Finally, the last panel in the bottom-right illustrates the skill gaps, indicating the marginaliza-
tion of low-skilled workers in comparison to high-skilled workers. We observe a substantial 
increase in the relative unemployment risk of the low-skilled, from around 9 percentage 
points in 2008 to 15 percentage points in 2014. In contrast, the skill gap in the temporary 
employment risk remained relatively stable over the crisis period. Similarly, there was only a 
small increase by 2 percentage points between 2005 and 2014 in the relative low-wage risk 
for low-skilled workers. Therefore, the economic shock does not seem to have been accom-
panied by higher relative temporary employment or low wage risks among low-skilled work-
ers, but still by an increase in the unemployment risk gap. However, the stability of the low 
wage risk may be an artefact of the relative definition of low wage thresholds, as these rela-
tions are insensitive to absolute wage declines across the whole workforce. Consequently, a 
stable low-wage risk does not mean that the wages of low-skilled workers were unaffected 
by the crisis. Overall, our results support the assertion that unemployment was the primary 
adjustment mechanism for low-skilled workers (Boeri and Jimeno, 2016; Heidenreich, 2015). 
In summary, we have identified different trends in the marginalization of the four vulnerable 
groups. For young people, we found an accumulation of all three dimensions of labor market 
risks. For low-skilled workers, we found what is likely more akin to a trade-off between the 
risk of being unemployed and the risk of having an insecure job or low wage: While the rela-
tive unemployment risk of low-skilled workers grew, low-wage and temporary employment 
risks were relatively stable. For migrants, we observed a similar trade-off - while the low-
wage gap increased, the temporary employment gap dropped, and the unemployment gap 
remained relatively stable. Finally, we observed a catching up of women with men regarding 
their relative unemployment risk. These trends have been more pronounced in the Southern 
European countries where the increase in youth unemployment has been much more se-
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Figure 2: Relative labor market risks of vulnerable groups in the Eurozone 
Source: EU-SILC 2005-2015, own calculations.
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To better be able to picture country differences regarding the trends of polarization and 
marginalization, we have plotted arrows between the degree of polarization and marginali-
zation in 2008 and in 2014 for each country in Figure 3. The figure depicts an increase in the 
degree of general outsider risks in every country except for Germany, Belgium and Latvia. 
These three countries had comparatively high shares of outsiders in 2008 but were able to 
reduce the polarization of the labor force by lowering employment-related risks during the 
crisis. In Germany, however, the level of marginalization increased significantly. In contrast, 
in Luxembourg, Estonia, Slovakia and Finland, it declined despite growing polarization. This 
means that the increasing risks of outsiderness have been more evenly distributed across 
the labor force, implying lower relative risks for high-skilled, native, older or male persons. 
Another pattern can be observed in the six countries which had been hit hardest by the cri-
sis: In 2014, Ireland, and the Southern European countries, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain were the only countries with a total share of outsiders over 40 % of the labor 
force. Moreover, the group-specific relative risks also grew in these countries. Therefore, 
these countries have experienced even higher levels of polarization and of marginalization. 
Although polarization and marginalization are analytically two different aspects, our results 
demonstrate that a crisis-related growth in polarization is accompanied with stronger rela-
tive risks for vulnerable groups in most countries. While the 19 Eurozone countries were 
more dispersed in 2008, a clear gap between the Southern countries plus Ireland and the 
other Eurozone countries can be observed in 2014: The Southern countries and Ireland 
clearly cluster in the upper right corner (high polarization and marginalization), while the 
other countries tend more to the lower left corner (low polarization and marginalization). 
This finding for the crisis-stricken countries is in line with previous studies which identified a 
‘double dualization’ of labor market inequality between and within European member states 
(Heidenreich, 2016). Such a clear economic and institutional divide between Northern and 
(mostly) Southern Eurozone countries has also been observed by the debate on growth 
models. The demand-led growth models in the Southern Eurozone countries are character-
ized by higher difficulties in operating wage restraint due to a lower level of wage bargaining 
coordination (Hall, 2014: 1226; Höpner and Lutter, 2018) and strong public sector unions 
(Iversen et al., 2016: 172–173). Therefore, we will test the impact of these institutions in the 
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Figure 3: Country trends in polarization (share of outsiders among the labor force) and marginalization (average relative risk of vulnerable groups) 
from 2008 to 2014 
Notes: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, CY= Cyprus, DE = Germany, EE = Estonia, EL = Greece, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, IE = Ireland, IT = 
Italy, LT = Lithuania, LU = Luxembourg, LV = Latvia, MT = Malta, NL = Netherlands, PT = Portugal, SI = Slovenia, SK = Slovakia. 
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5. Institutional determinants of polarization and marginali-
zation 
After describing the polarization of the labor force and marginalization of vulnerable groups 
during the Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis, we will now analyze the effects of the 
previously described labor market institutions – employment protection legislation, union 
density and wage bargaining centralization – on both of these trends. In Table 1, we present 
a series of regression models with panel-corrected standard errors for our two dependent 
variables (summary statistics of the used macro-level variables are presented in table A.5 in 
the appendix). To account for the crisis effect, we included the change of the national GDP in 
all models. Models 1a and 1b contain the main effects of GDP change and the three institu-
tions. The other models add interactions between GDP change and the institutions in order 
to test how these institutions moderated the effect of a changing GDP growth. 
Concerning the polarization level, Model 1a predicts that a 1 percentage point increase in 
GDP over the previous year decreases the absolute outsider risk by approximately 0.45 per-
centage points. For the group-specific relative outsider risk, there is no significant effect of 
the GDP. Therefore, economic growth or decline only has a direct effect on the polarization 
of the whole labor force, but not on the marginalization of vulnerable groups.  
The EPL for regular contracts does not have a significant effect on either polarization or mar-
ginalization. The missing effect on polarization supports previous observations that a stricter 
regulation is not necessarily associated with a higher unemployment rate (Blanchard, 2006: 
30; Nickell, 1997: 72). In contrast, the missing effect on marginalization differs from recent 
studies which showed that a stricter protection of regular jobs increases: the risk of tempo-
rary employment for young people (Gebel and Giesecke, 2016), as well as the risks of being 
unemployed or having a fixed-term job for low-skilled workers (Gebel and Giesecke, 2011). It 
is also shown to decrease the job prospects for women (Biegert, 2017). A possible interpre-
tation could be that trade-off effects exist both between different types of risks and be-
tween different vulnerable groups: A higher relative unemployment risk of vulnerable 
groups does not automatically increase their degree of marginalization if dismissals primarily 
hit either the temporarily employed or low-wage earners. Additionally, increasing relative 
employment risks of young people have been accompanied by lower risks for women as 
shown in the previous chapter.  
The EPL for temporary contracts has a significantly positive effect on marginalization. Mean-
while, the effect is less clear for polarization as it is only significant at the 10% level. There-
fore, stricter regulations of temporary employment in a country are associated with higher 
risk gaps between vulnerable groups and the core workforce. This can be explained by the 
fact that employers refrain from offering fixed-term contracts when confronted with higher 
barriers for them. This leads to a reduction in employment opportunities for vulnerable 
groups in particular. This also corresponds to the results of Barbieri and Cutuli (2016), who 
found that a more regulated use of temporary contracts is associated with less temporary 
employment for young people or low-skilled workers.  
Models 1a and 2a show that polarization is neither directly influenced by strict EPL for regu-
lar jobs nor by a changing GDP. However, the effect of GDP growth on marginalization de-
creases with stricter EPLs for regular contracts, as can be seen in Model 2b. In cyclical up-
swing, marginalization seems to decrease more in highly regulated labor markets compared 
to less regulated ones. In contrast, in times of a cyclical downturn, marginalization is higher 
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in strictly regulated labor markets. One explanation for this could be that core workers are 
better protected against economic shocks, while vulnerable groups are more exposed to 
outsider risks in times of crisis. In less regulated labor markets, the different groups in the 
workforce are more equally affected by demand shocks and economic crises. Regarding the 
EPL for temporary employment, the non-significant interactions with changing GDP growth 
indicate that the effects of regulations for temporary contracts is independent of the eco-
nomic cycle. 
Centralization of wage bargaining has a negative effect on polarization and a positive one on 
marginalization. These effects are only significant while including a squared term of centrali-
zation, which confirms the assumption of a hump-shaped rather than a linear relationship 
(Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). In concrete terms, this means that polarization is lower when 
wage bargaining takes place at the sector or industry level, and it is higher when it takes 
place at the company or the national level. This contradicts the assumption of Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988) that both highly centralized and highly decentralized wage bargaining systems 
enable a stronger wage restraint and thus contribute to lower real wage increases and lower 
unemployment rates. The positive inclination of the relationship between polarization and 
wage bargaining centralization might indicate that decentralized bargaining systems do not 
only facilitate wage flexibility, but also lead to higher shares of low-wage employment. In 
addition, wage moderation might not work in the context of the Eurozone crisis which was 
characterized by a very low inflation rate. Under these conditions, wage moderation would 
imply nominal wage cuts which are near impossible to achieve in any wage bargaining sys-
tem. The ECB therefore observes: “the proportion of observed wage cuts stays well below the 
level that would correspond to a flexible regime.” (Branten et al., 2018: 3) Instead of wage cuts, 
companies may rely on other strategies for reducing their wage costs, particularly lower em-
ployment and higher unemployment levels, thereby increasing polarization, most notably in 
centralized and decentralized systems. This implies that the Euro may have introduced a new 
form of rigidity because it abolished the instrument of monetary devaluations which allowed 
real wage decreases without nominal wage cuts. In addition, our results indicate that mar-
ginalization is highest when wage bargaining takes place at the intermediate level. This find-
ing may indicate that – even if real wage cuts for existing contracts have become difficult in a 
macroeconomic context characterized by low inflation, companies still have the opportunity 
of reducing wage costs by offering lower wages or fixed-term contracts to new employees. 
This strategic option may be particularly interesting in a more strongly regulated and coordi-
nated bargaining systems because it allows the protection of the core workforce at the cost 
of labor market entrants or other vulnerable groups. Furthermore, the interaction effects 
between GDP growth and centralization are not significant, indicating that the main effects 
do not clearly differ during the business cycle. 
Union density, as a proxy for the strength and bargaining power of unions and employees, 
has a significant negative effect on polarization, while showing no effect on marginalization. 
A higher union density thus correlates with a lower share of outsiders in a country. This 
could be driven by wage compression and lower rates of low-wage employment due to egal-
itarian wage bargaining strategies. Even if unions do not reduce risks of unemployment or 
temporary employment, our results suggest that they are pillars of egalitarian societies (cf. 
Kenworthy, 2004), which is in line with recent findings (Fervers and Schwander, 2015). The 
lower polarization of the workforce is even more accentuated during a crisis when compared 
to countries with weaker unions, as shown by Model 5a and Figure 4. For marginalization, 
the joint effect of union density and economic change is not so clear. Overall, it seems that 
strong unions contribute to a better protection of employees – especially in times of crisis. 
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In sum, we observe a clear contribution of the crisis to a stronger polarization, but not nec-
essarily to a marginalization of the workforce (which supports H1a and H1b). However, we 
do not observe an effect of a stricter EPL for regular jobs on the polarization and marginali-
zation of the workforce unless it is interacted with GDP change. In this case, a declining GDP 
seems to lead to a higher degree of marginalization in highly regulated labor markets due to 
higher hiring and firing costs which is in line with H2a. On the contrary, EPLs for temporary 
employment affect only the degree of marginalization, independently of a changing GDP. 
Thus, stricter regulations of the use of fixed-term contracts is associated with a higher mar-
ginalization of vulnerable groups due to fewer opportunities to enter the labor market. Fur-
thermore, we showed that polarization is lower in intermediary wage bargaining systems 
while marginalization is higher, which challenges H2b. This result highlights the importance 
of differentiating between outsider risks of the total labor force and specific risks for vulner-
able groups. Finally, we also observed a lower outsider risk in countries with strong unions, 
especially in times of crisis, which confirms H2c.  
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Table 1: Pooled linear regressions with panel-corrected standard errors of polarization and marginalization on labor market institutions. 
 Polarization (level of outsider risks)  Marginalization (group-specific outsider risks) 
 M1a M2a M3a M4a M5a  M1b M2b M3b M4b M5b 
GDP change -0.450*** -0.295 -0.507*** -0.569** -0.533***  -0.012 0.240+ -0.042 -0.029 -0.064+ 
 (0.109) (0.208) (0.139) (0.212) (0.116)  (0.038) (0.130) (0.052) (0.069) (0.039) 
EPL regular 0.038 0.041 0.051 0.028 -0.108  -0.340 -0.312 -0.347 -0.327 -0.381 
 (0.878) (0.871) (0.860) (0.775) (0.889)  (0.472) (0.442) (0.474) (0.466) (0.478) 
EPL temporary 0.883+ 0.926+ 0.846 1.018* 0.853+  0.645** 0.676** 0.600* 0.658** 0.639** 
 (0.523) (0.521) (0.529) (0.468) (0.517)  (0.224) (0.218) (0.235) (0.223) (0.226) 
Centralization  -3.211* -3.212* -3.138* -3.301* -3.025*  1.781** 1.777** 1.809** 1.875** 1.846** 
 (1.458) (1.447) (1.448) (1.538) (1.455)  (0.602) (0.590) (0.603) (0.620) (0.585) 
Centralization ² 0.397* 0.394* 0.386* 0.415+ 0.370+  -0.251** -0.256** -0.256** -0.267** -0.263** 
 (0.197) (0.195) (0.196) (0.222) (0.196)  (0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.090) (0.083) 
Union density -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.115*** -0.119***  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.003 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.024)  (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
GDP change × EPL regular  -0.064      -0.103*      (0.070)      (0.052)    
GDP change × EPL temporary   0.029      0.017      (0.040)      (0.019)   
GDP change × Centralization     0.128      0.002      (0.224)      (0.083)  
GDP change × Centralization ²    -0.024      0.003      (0.042)      (0.016)  
GDP change × Union density     0.005***      0.003***      (0.002)      (0.001) 
Intercept 42.467*** 42.450*** 42.472*** 42.450*** 42.588***  6.132*** 6.073*** 6.202*** 5.884*** 6.142*** 
 (4.116) (4.123) (3.983) (3.780) (4.176)  (1.158) (1.136) (1.175) (1.131) (1.233) 
R² 0.764 0.762 0.758 0.742 0.773  0.455 0.465 0.456 0.458 0.470 
N(country-years) 170 170 170 170 170  170 170 170 170 170 
N(countries) 17 17 17 17 17  17 17 17 17 17 





Figure 4: Predicted values of GDP change on polarization and marginalization dependent on 
union density (UD). Source: Model 5a and 5b from Table 1. 
6. Conclusion 
As labor markets in the Eurozone had to become the major buffer against economic shocks 
due to the abolition of fiscal and monetary buffers (cf. Grauwe, 2018), this paper set out to 
analyze how the economic shocks were absorbed by the labor markets of the Eurozone. 
Based on data from the EU-SILC for 19 Eurozone countries from 2005 to 2014, we illustrated 
how the burdens of the Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis affected the outsider risks 
of the labor force in general and the relative outsider risks of vulnerable groups in particular 
across labor markets within the Eurozone. While polarization was strongly affected by the 
economic downturn, the marginalization of vulnerable groups grew less strongly which 
seems to support our hypothesis that marginalization is more dependent on the institutional 
setting than polarization.  
In an aggregate perspective, the risk of being a labor market outsider (polarization) – meas-
ured as the unemployment, low-wage or temporary employment risk of labor market out-
siders – increased in most Eurozone countries, but particularly so in the Southern European 
countries. This led to a higher divergence of labor market risks between member states of 
the Eurozone. Unemployment is the driver of this increasing polarization. Furthermore, we 
analyzed the marginalization of four particularly vulnerable groups at the micro level: For 
young people, we found an accumulation of all three dimensions of labor market risks. For 
low-skilled workers and migrants, we observed a trade-off between the risks of being unem-
ployed, being temporary employed or earning a low wage. Finally, we observed a catching 




pronounced in the Southern European countries, particularly for young people, as they ex-
perienced a sharp increase in outsider risks. This is consistent with previous studies high-
lighting the serious impact of the crisis on young people (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011).  
The stronger polarization and marginalization in regions such as Southern Europe and Ire-
land increased the division within the Eurozone and reversed the trend towards cohesion 
and more inclusive labor markets, which has been a major goal of European and national 
employment strategies since the 1990s. The huge increase in between-country differences 
regarding the degree of polarization and marginalization reflects the asymmetric distribution 
of economic adjustment burdens between the Southern and Northern regions of Europe.  
Additionally, we analyzed the effects of classic labor market institutions on polarization and 
marginalization. These institutions have been singled out as sources of the rigid European 
labor markets by labor economists. We showed that polarization clearly increases with a 
declining GDP, while marginalization does not. Instead, a declining GDP seems to lead to a 
higher marginalization only in labor markets with strict employment protection for regular 
contracts. Moreover, stricter regulation for temporary contracts are accompanied by higher 
marginalization of vulnerable groups, because it reduces the opportunities of these groups 
to enter the labor market. This effect seems to be independent of the economic cycle. We 
also observed a lower outsider risk for the whole labor force in countries with strong unions 
which is even more pronounced in times of crisis. Finally, we showed that centralized wage 
bargaining is generally linked to weaker polarization, but stronger marginalization. Overall, 
the institutions seem to have a mixed influence on the two dimensions of labor market seg-
mentation: strict EPLs and centralized bargaining increase the marginalization of vulnerable 
groups, while strong unions reduce polarization in times of economic downturns.  
Taken together, our findings show that classical institutions are still crucial determinants of 
labor market segmentation. In addition, the Euro in combination with low inflation have cre-
ated new types of rigidities due to abolition of external devaluations. It therefore may be 
inappropriate to speculate about a phase “beyond Eurosclerosis”. Perhaps it is more helpful 
to stick to the concept of socially embedded labor markets and analyze the divide between 
exclusive and inclusive labor markets. This would perhaps better reflect the differences be-
tween diverse institutional settings in Southern and other European labor markets and their 
respective impacts on polarization and marginalization.  
While we operationalized ‘outsiderness’ as a dichotomous variable, further research could 
consider the degree of outsiderness by distinguishing if one person is affected by one or 
more of the three risks or by considering the duration a person is exposed to a risk (e.g. 
short- or long-term unemployment). In a similar vein, further research may focus on other 
vulnerable groups beyond the four groups examined in this study (e.g. disabled or sick per-
sons, single mothers). In addition, possible interdependencies and trade-offs between dif-
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